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RECENT CASES
practice of service stations to make services available to customers and
guests alike.18 Would the plaintiff acquire the business invitee status when
she came to meet her husband later, instead of accompanying him, irrespec-
tive of whether she arrived before, during, or after the business was con-
summated? Is meeting an invitee a purpose for which a service station
is thrown open?
The instant court concluded that the husband's status as a business
visitor ended when after he had completed his business he choose to re-
main in the office and wait for his wife. The invitation, expressed or im-
plied, did not contemplate his use of the premises as a waiting place.' 7
Presumably, the visitor would be "protected", under this view, only for a
length of time sufficient for him to reach his auto and drive away.1 8
The preferred position of an invitee can be changed to that of a "mere",
"bare" or "gratuitous" licensee while he is on the premises. 10 This con-
version, however, has traditionally resulted from a venture into a restricted
area,
2 0 
or some other conduct of the invitee beyond the spirit of the in-
vitation.2 ' Some cases do hold that waiting beyond a reasonable length
of time also converts the invitee into a licensee.
22
The court in the instant case did not state whether the plaintiff would
have been entitled to compensation had her husband retained his status
of a business invitee. It merely concluded that under the circumstances
presented, the status of the principal governed.23 Thus the guest's status is
derivative rather than of his own right. A rigid application of this rule
might require that if a child accompanied its parent shopping and the par-
ent went into a restricted area, thus becoming a licensee, and the child
was injured outside the restricted area, the child would be denied recov-
ery because of the parent's frolic. Had the wife, in the instant case, joined
her husband before conclusion of his business, application of this "status
by derivation" theory would enable her to recover.
Louis R. MOORE
INSURANCE LIMIT OF LIABILITY - MEANING OF "EACH ACCIDENT". -
Plaintiff's truck was negligently operated so as to collide with a freight train
and damage sixteen cars owned by fourteen separate companies. Plaintiff's
insurance contract obligated defendant insurer to pay $5,000 property dam-
age for "each accident" involving the insured. After suit was brought against
16. See Wingrove v. Home Land Co., 120 W.Va. 100, 196 S.E. 563, 566 (1938) "It
would be strange indeed if the owner of an automobile driving into a filling station with
members of his family, or with selected and invited guests, would be held to be an invitee,
rnd the other occupants mere licensees."
17. Instant case at 528-9.
18. See Prosser, Torts §79 (1941) (Invite has right to safe exit).
19.. See Prosser, Torts §79 (1941); 65 C.J.S. Negligence §46 p. 535, note 35.
20. E.g. Wilson v. *Goodrich, 218 Iowa 462, 252 N.W. 142 (1943); Keeran v.
Spurgeon Mercantile Co., 194 Iowa 1240, 190 N.W. 99 (1922); Pellicot v. Keene, 181 Md.
138, 28 A.2d 826 (1942).
21. Southwest Cotton Co. 4'. Pope, 25 Ariz. 364, 218 P. 152 (1923); Lerman Bros.
v. Lewis. 277 Ky. 334, 126 S.W.2d 461 (1939); see Hickman v. First Nat. Bank of
Great Falls, 112 Mont. 398, 117 P.2d 275, 277 (1941); Prosser, Torts §79 (1941).
22. Heinlein v. Boston & P. R. Co., 147 Mass. 136, 16 N.E. 698 (1888).
23. See Meyer v. Manzer, 179 Misc. 355, 39 N.Y.S. 5, 7 (1943).
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plaintiff, he sued his insurer demanding indemnity for property damage in
amounts substantially exceeding $5,000. Defendant contended the collision
constituted but one accident within the meaning of the policy limit. The
court held that the injury to fourteen property owners constituted fourteen
separate accidents and that defendant was thus obligated to pay up to $5,000
to each property owner. Saint Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Rutland, 217
F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1954).'
Judicial determination of the scope of the word "accident" has resulted
in contradition., An early English case similar to the one at hand held the
injury to each person to be a separate accidcnt.Y In 1926 a California court
held injuries to several property owners did not constitute separate acci-
dents, but rather that each injury was merely an incident of one accident;:;
a later California decision flatly stated that any one accident may be made
up of injuries to an unlimited number of persons. 4
Probably the most persuasive argument in the majority opinion points out
that the insurer used the word "occurrence" when referring to the limits ap-
plicable to personal injuries, but used the word "accident" with respect to
its limits for property damage. The court observed: "The words in the
policy, each person, each occurrence, and each accident, were evidently
used with comprehension and discrimination as to their differences in mean-
ing."' Although the court followed the principle that any ambiguity must
be construed most strongly against the insurer and in favor of the insured,,;
the above analysis apparently led it to conclude that in its context, the
phrase "each accident" required the result reached; that in fact, there was
no ambiguity.
Had the court found no ambiguity, there would have been no oppor-
tunity for a construction in favor of the insured.7 Rather, the cardinal
rule of contract construction requiring that the policy be enforced according
to the intention of the parties 8 would have been applied. Thus, the dissent-
(A). Since this comment was written the circuit court has granted a rehearing in the
instant case.
1. See, e.g., Hyer v. Inter-Insurance Exchange, 77 Cal. App. 343, 246 Pac. 1055, 1057
(1926' (The following dicta presenting an interesting contrast to the instant case appeared:
"It would be no more correct to say of such a case that there were two accidents than t
would to be predicate two or more accidents on a general freight train wreck, merely be-
cause two or more cars in the train might have been demolished in the same catastrophe.")
2. The South Staffordshire Tramways Co., Ltd. v. The Sickness and Accident Assur-
ance Ass'n, Ltd., 1 Q.B. 402 (1891).
3. Hyer v. Inter-Insurance Exchange, 77 Cal. App. 343, 246 Pac. 1055, 1058 (1926)
(Insured's automobile colided with another causing the steering gear to break on insured's
vehicle so that he collided with a second car. The damage exceeded the $1,000 limit
provided in the policy for "one accident". The court held the entire catastrophe to be
one accident saying in part, "So here the collision with the Cadillac, a part of the general
catastrophe in vhich th three automobiles were involved, was but an 'incident' of the
accident, and not a separate accident.").
4. Perkins v. Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co., 44 Cal. App. 2d 427, 112 P.2d 670
(1941).
5. Instant case at 588.
6. See, e.g., Lee v. Aetna Cas, & Surety Co., 178 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir. 1949);
Sampson v. Century Indemnity Co., 8 Cal. 2d 476, 66 P.2d 434, 436 (1937); Freese v.
Saint Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 252 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Mo. 1952).
7. Sec London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. v. Neil Barron Fuel Co., 31 F. Supp. 599,
600 (W.D.Mo. 1940).
8. E.g., Zehnder v. Michaud, 145 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1944); New York Cas. Co. v.
Sinclair Refining Co., 108 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1939); M. O'Neil Supply Co. v. Petroleum
Heat & Power Co., 280 N.Y. 50, 19 N.E.2d 676,679 (1939) ("The fundamental rule in
the construction of all agreements is to ascertain the substantial intent of the parties.").
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ing opinion pointed out that the ordinary meaning of the word "accident"
may include many injuries and any number of collisions. To illustrate this,
the following report from the New York Times was cited: "Two persons
were killed, seven persons were injured and twenty-seven vehicles, includ-
ing a bus and three tncks, were damaged today in four accidents on a fog-
shrouded, half-mile section of the New Jersey Turnpike. The four accidents
occurred within twenty minutes .... 9
For years insurance companies have used the words "one accident" or
"each accident" to limit liability. The standard automobile liability policy
limits coverage to a fixed amount for bodily injuries to "each person", a larger
anount for all bodily injuries resulting from "each accident" and a fixed
amount for property damage resulting from "each accident". 1° Obviously,
when used with reference to bodily injury, the phrase, "each accident" must
necessarily contemplate the inclusion of injuries to more than one individual
since, if the injury to each person were viewed as a separate accident, the
higher limit would become meaningless. It is submitted that the intention
of the parties, when using the word "accident", is to include injury or dam-
age to as many individuals as may be involved in one general catastrophe
or mishap, so long as the injuries flow from a common act of negligence,
provided a substantial amount of time has not intervened between injuries.
It is the ordinary meaning of the word that must control in seeking the in-
tention of the parties."1 Given an ordinary interpretation, then, a single
accident will include the damage to two vehicles when they collide although
the property of two individuals is damaged. The press and radio, with their
great influence on the language, have accorded such a meaning to the word
and there is little apparent reason for attaching a different meaning whcn
it is used in an insurance policy.
JON N. VOGEL
SALES - REMEDIES OF BUYER - ELECTION OF REMEDIES. - Plaintiff, a
candy manufacturer, purchased pecans from defendant and used some of
them in candy. The defective condition of the pecans was discovered after
some candy had been returned by customers. Plaintiff, upon suggestion of
Defendant, returned the unused pecans in exchange for enough usable
pecans to make up the deficiency. Plaintiff then sued for damages for the
loss of the value of the candy in which the defective pecans were used and
for the loss of prospective profits and good will resulting from sale of the
candy containing the defective pecans. Defendant contended Plaintiff had
9. Instant case at 589 (dissenting opinion).
10. 4 Richards. Law of Insurance 2083, 2084 (5th ed. 1952) (A reprint of the
Standard Automobile Policy Garage Liability).
11. Instant case at 590 (dissenting opinion) "Since 1891 the word 'accident', certainly
in relation to highway disasters, has acquired a very definite meaning in the United States.";
Perkins v. Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co., 44 Cal. App. 2d 427, 112 P.2d 670, 672
(1941) "Obviously, the words 'one person' refer to the injured person, and the words 'one
..ccident' to the inury of several persons, regardless of how many may suffer loss by reason
thereof."; Wilderman v. Watters, 149 Neb. 102, 30 N.W.2d 301, 303, 304 (1948) "The
cardinal rule in the interpretation of a contract is to ascertain the intention of the parties,
and to give effect to such intention if it can be done consisently with legal principles. In
construing contracts the court's sole duty is to ascertain what was meant by the language
of the instrument."
